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ARTICLE
CURIOUS IN-LAWS: THE LEGAL CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN MONTANA AND PUERTO RICO
Jorge M. Farinacci Ferno´s*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the face of it, Puerto Rico and Montana seem to have very little
in common. One is a former Spanish colony in the Caribbean whose legal
system is mostly based on the civil law tradition. The other is one of the
largest, yet most underpopulated, states of the United States, located on the
Canadian border. Yet, as with many things related to law and history, ap-
pearances can be deceiving.
When I ask my students in Puerto Rico to name which United States
state has greater similarities to Puerto Rico in terms of legal systems and
content, many propose places like Louisiana or California. And they’re not
completely wrong. For example, Louisiana and Puerto Rico share civil law
roots. In fact, when the United States acquired sovereignty over the island
from Spain in 1898, the new rulers imported many legal sources from Loui-
siana in order to ensure a smooth transition.1 As to California, many of the
early twentieth-century statutes adopted in Puerto Rico were imported from
that state.2
* B.A., M.A. (University of Puerto Rico-Rı´o Piedras), J.D. (University of Puerto Rico Law
School); LL.M. (Harvard Law School); S.J.D. (Georgetown University Law Center). Assistant Professor
of Law, Interamerican University of Puerto Rico Law School.
1. David C. Indiano, Federal District Court in Puerto Rico: A Brief Look at the Court and Federal
Handling of Commonwealth Civil Law in Diversity Cases, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 231, 240–41
(1981).
2. See Pen˜a v. Garcı´a, 45 P.R. Dec. 44, 3–4 (P.R. 1953).
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But when I ask my students to continue the list, it usually takes them
mentioning well more than half the states before they come up with Mon-
tana. But the truth is that Montana and Puerto Rico have many different
legal connections that, as we are about to see, transcend mere chance or
coincidence. Something else is afoot. Whether it is constitutional text, envi-
ronmental protections, labor policy, or even condominium statutes, there
seems to be sufficient trees to make up a forest. In other words, it appears
that the legal connection between Puerto Rico and Montana is not a one-off,
nor an anomaly. As a result, it would be normatively legitimate, convenient,
and even required, that each jurisdiction gives preferential treatment to the
other as a matter of comparative law. Montana and Puerto Rico have be-
come in-laws.
In that sense, this Article is both descriptive and normative. As to the
descriptive element, Part II of this Article will analyze the different meeting
points between Puerto Rican and Montana law. These connections tran-
scend mere comparative law techniques. They are organic connections that
require each jurisdiction to look to the other as part of the history behind
particular legal sources. In other words, ordinary tools of interpretation re-
quire this matchup. Regarding the normative argument, Part III argues that,
precisely because of the repeating existence of a legal link between both
jurisdictions, the use of Puerto Rican law in Montana—and vice-versa—
should not be limited to the particular instances of actual relation as a mat-
ter of pure hermeneutics. On the contrary, I propose that these multiple
connections require a more formal interaction between both jurisdictions,
particularly regarding the interpretation and application of legal sources.
Each should be the other’s go-to jurisdiction when engaging in comparative
law.
II. A CENTURY OF CONNECTION: DIGNITY, DISCRIMINATION, LABOR,
AND SO MUCH MORE
A. First Contacts: Justice James Harvey McLeary and
the California Connection
Montana came into Puerto Rico’s life first. That is, chronologically,
Puerto Rico law referenced Montana before Montana referenced Puerto
Rico. This makes sense, as Puerto Rico became a possession of the United
States a decade after Montana was admitted as the forty-first state.
Following the invasion of 1898, Puerto Rico gained civilian govern-
ment in 1900.3 At that time, the justices of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
3. ANTONIO FERN ´OS-ISERN, ORIGINAL INTENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF PUERTO RICO: NOTES AND
COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (2d ed., 2002).
2
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were appointed by the President of the United States.4 As one might expect,
many of these justices were United States born. Among the first was James
Harvey McLeary, who had served previously as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana.5 Appointed in 1886 to that
bench, McLeary was appointed to the Puerto Rican court in 1901.6
As early as 1902, Puerto Rico began its connection with Montana. Af-
ter shedding off much of the previous Spanish-colonial system, Puerto Rico
embarked on a process of legal importation from the United States. Chief
among these were California’s Civil and Penal Codes. But Puerto Rico was
not the only jurisdiction to follow in California’s path. As Justice McLeary
explained in a concurring opinion in 1903, Montana and Idaho also took
their cue from the same California sources.7 Likely guided by his previous
experience as a judge in Montana, Justice McLeary referenced Montana’s
interpretation of the borrowed statutes as authority for the interpretation of
the Puerto Rican versions.8 Turns out that the Montana precedent was au-
thored by none other than Justice McLeary himself.9
But Justice McLeary’s reference to Montana was not based solely on
the author’s familiarity with that state or his own vanity. As it turns out,
though Puerto Rico borrowed directly from California—as did Montana—
Montana’s and Puerto Rico’s versions of the laws were actually more simi-
lar to each other’s. As Justice McLeary explained in Gime´nez, et al., a
crucial provision of the California statute was left out of both of the Puerto
Rican and Montana versions.10 This required courts to skip California and
use Montana directly as a source of legal meaning. Justice McLeary would
continue his practice of citing Montana cases as authority.11
After Justice McLeary’s retirement, Puerto Rican reference to Mon-
tana became more superficial, but nonetheless present.12 The Puerto Rico
4. Id. at 10.
5. Claudia Hazelwood, Handbook of Texas Online, https://perma.cc/7EQR-VCUX (last visited
June 18, 2018).
6. Id.
7. Ex parte Mauleo´n, 4 P.R. Dec. 123, 11 (P.R. 1903) (McLeary, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 11–12.
9. Lane v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Missoula Co., 13 P. 136 (Mont. 1887). Justice McLeary
would cite this case as authority again in Gime´nez et al. v. Brenes, 10 P.R. Dec. 128 (P.R. 1906)
(McLeary, J., dissenting).
10. Gime´nez et al., 10 P.R. Dec. at 19. While the same phenomenon occurred in Idaho—another
state that copied California—Justice McLeary focused more heavily on Montana as a source for the
interpretation of the Puerto Rican version. The crucial difference between Montana and Puerto Rico, on
the one hand, and the original California norm, on the other, was the character of a foreclosure, from an
ordinary process to a summary one.
11. See, e.g., Ex parte Diaz (a) Martillo, 7 P.R. Dec. 153 (P.R. 1904) (citing U.S. v. Sacramento, 2
Mont. 239 (1875)).
12. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Collazo, 33 P.R. Dec. 49 (P.R. 1924); Va´zquez v. Porto Rico Railway,
Light & Power Co., 35 P.R. Dec. 62 (P.R. 1926).
3
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Supreme Court would again reference the similarity between both jurisdic-
tions’ adoption and modification of the California Civil Code in 1933.13
More passing references continued.14 But this was only the beginning.
B. Puerto Rico’s Constitution and a Sneak Peek at Montana
When Puerto Rico wrote its Constitution in 1951–52, it looked to
many comparative sources, including the federal Constitution, the constitu-
tion of other countries, as well as international sources such as the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.15 It also looked to state constitutions for gui-
dance and inspiration.16
No single state stood out as the main or principal model. But, several
key provisions of the constitutional text mirrored similar provisions in state
constitutions, including Montana. Puerto Rico’s constitutional provisions
mimicked those in many state constitutions, including Montana’s. Such is
the case of clauses dealing with social security,17 child labor,18 and freedom
of religion, and separation of church and state.19 As to the provision estab-
lishing an eight-hour workday, the Puerto Rico provision mirrored eight
state constitutions, including Montana.20 As we can see, many of these
shared provisions deal with issues of social and economic policy.
But Puerto Rico also adopted other constitutional provisions that re-
sembled Montana’s text. For example, Puerto Rico’s constitutionally pre-
scribed structure of legislative re-districting, which gives a central role to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and legislative leaders, is similar to
those of nine states at the time Puerto Rico adopted its Constitution in
1952.21 Puerto Rican scholars have noticed that Montana has a similar,
though different, model.22
13. Pen˜a v. Garcı´a, 45 P.R. Dec. 44, 3–4 (P.R. 1953) (citing In re Davis’ Est., 27 P. 342, 346
(Mont. 1891)).
14. Fournier v. Gonza´lez, 80 P.R. Dec. 262, 269 (P.R. 1958), referencing the absence of a require-
ment of unanimity of the jury in criminal trials.
15. FERN ´OS-ISERN, supra note 3, at xi.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 33 n.1. The provision mirrored MONT. CONST. art. X, § 5.
18. Id. at 33–34 n.2 (citing MONT. CONST art. XVIII, § 3).
19. Id. at 36 n.11 (citing MONT. CONST. art. III).
20. Id. at 33 n.6 (citing MONT. CONST. art. VI).
21. Id. at 50–53 (citing MONT. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4).
22. Antonio Garcı´a Padila, La seccio´n 4 del Artı´culo III de la Constitucio´n del Estado Libre
Asociado de Puerto Rico, 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 489, 503–505 (1996).
4
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C. The Tables Turn: Montana Starts to Copy Puerto Rico
1. Looking Upward and Lost in Translation
As we will see later on, one of the best-known examples of Montana
borrowing Puerto Rican legal sources is the human dignity clause found in
both Constitutions. Yet, the first instance of Montana taking a page from
Puerto Rico was in the realm of property rights, particularly the statutory
scheme applicable to condominiums.
As Robert Natelson explains, “[i]n 1958, Puerto Rico became the first
United States jurisdiction to enact a condominium statute, relying heavily
on a 1952 Cuban law.”23 This represented a trend that started in the civil
law tradition of allowing individual ownership in a multi-unit housing com-
plex. Just three years later, “Congress responded to a Puerto Rican lobbying
effort by amending the Federal Housing Act to permit the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to insure condominium mortgages.”24 As a result,
the FHA issued the Model Statute for the Creation of Apartment Owner-
ship, based on the Puerto Rican scheme.25 And, in 1965, Montana adopted a
statute whose “text largely traces the FHA Model Statute, which reflects in
turn the 1958 Puerto Rico enactment.”26
The extent of Montana’s borrowing meant that Montana soon found
itself lost in translation. As Natelson explains, the legislature had to amend
the condominium statute because some of the text in the FHA Model was
based on a civil law structure. For example, provisions relating to “juridical
acts inter vivos or mortis causa” seemed like gibberish and wholly foreign
to the common law tradition.27 Any lawyer in a civil law jurisdiction, in-
cluding Puerto Rico, would quickly identify this phrase and know that it
merely made reference to legal transactions between living persons or as the
result of an inheritance. The Montana statute also included other
“[u]ncritical borrowing from civil law sources” that created anomalous re-
sults.28 But this was just prelude. The main event came during Montana’s
1971–72 Constitutional Convention.
23. Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform, and the Unit Ownership Act, 58 MONT. L. REV.
495, 500 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 502. This refers to the Montana Unit Ownership Act.
27. Id. Natelson suggests that this language includes “terms hardly common in American law.” He
suggests that the “reason for the oddity is that this section is almost a direct transliteration from the
Puerto Rican text, which served a civil law, rather than a common law environment.” Id. at 503.
28. Id. at 504 (referencing the concept of ‘manager’ and the role of condominium bylaws).
5
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2. Constitutional Similarities
a. Shared Dignity and Prohibited Discrimination
Puerto Rico’s 1952 Constitution was part of the new wave of constitu-
tionalism that emerged from World War II. Its Bill of Rights was then, as it
is today, a prime example of progressive constitutionalism.29 The Constitu-
tion recognizes a whole series of individual rights that transcend the ante-
bellum catalogue of liberal rights. Its attention to human dignity as a central
feature of the constitutional order, the adoption of an expansive list of pro-
hibited discrimination, the inclusion of several labor rights—both individ-
ual and collective—as well as other social policy provisions, makes Puerto
Rico’s Constitution a trailblazer.
Such is the case that the Montana Constitutional Convention of
1971–72 looked to Puerto Rico for guidance, inspiration, and plain-old tex-
tual borrowing. The most famous instance of textual borrowing—with all
the normative consequences that entails—is the dignity clause, which also
addresses discrimination.
Section 1, Article II of Puerto Rico’s Constitution states:
the dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal before the
law. No discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Both the laws and
the system of public education shall embody these principles of essential
human equality.30
For its part, Article II, Section 4 of Montana’s Constitution states:
the dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.31
Let’s break this down. First of all, note that the dignity clauses are
textually identical. This is no coincidence. While it is true that “Montana is
unique among the fifty U.S. states to so explicitly and generally protect
29. See Jorge M. Farinacci Ferno´s, Originalism in Puerto Rico: Original Explication and its Rela-
tion with Clear Text, Broad Purpose and Progressive Policy, 85 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 203, 247–48 (2016).
30. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1. See also P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“No person in Puerto Rico shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”).
31. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
6
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human dignity in its constitutional document[,]”32 the same cannot be said
about U.S. jurisdictions. In fact, Puerto Rico’s text actually came first.33
More to the point, there is universal recognition that the language in
Puerto Rico’s clause was “ultimately borrowed and included in the Mon-
tana Constitution.”34 It was a direct, intentional, and conscious act of tex-
tual borrowing. As Amanda Eklund suggests, “[t]he dignity provision of the
Montana Constitution was modeled largely after a similar provision in the
Puerto Rico Constitution.”35 This fact has not been lost on Puerto Rican
scholars,36 although the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has only made pass-
ing references to it. But the fact remains that Montana adopted Puerto
Rico’s dignity clause word-for-word.
This act of comparative lawmaking was made by a delegate to the
Montana Constitutional Convention named Richard Champoux, who con-
firmed the Puerto Rican origin of the text.37 The dignity clause of the Mon-
tana Constitution inspired “very limited debate” during the deliberations of
the Montana Constitutional Convention.38 Thus, there would seem to be
little on which to build a separate, distinct, or independent construction of
the Montana provision, as opposed to the content found in the Puerto Rican
text. In other words, because the Montana drafters said so little about the
content, meaning, and scope of the dignity clause, the fact that it was copied
word-for-word from the Puerto Rican Constitution would lead us to the
conclusion that Montana also copied the conceptual content of that original
32. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Con-
stitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 21 (2004). See also, Matthew O. Clifford & Thomas P.
Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s ‘Dignity’ Clause with
Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301, 302 n.6 (2000) (emphasis added) (“Though the Montana
Constitution’s dignity clause is unusual, it is not unique. See, e.g., P.R. Const. art. II, §1.”). It is worth
noting that both Illinois and Louisiana have some reference to the concept of human dignity in their
respective constitutions. Both texts were adopted after Puerto Rico and Montana had approved their own
versions. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 21.
33. This does not mean that Puerto Rico’s dignity clause was the first of its kind. West Germany,
the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also included refer-
ences to human dignity as a legal concept. See Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 2(1), 2(2) (F.R.G.); see
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
34. Jackson, supra note 32, at 22; Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 321.
35. Amanda K. Eklund, The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the Constitutional Right to
Individual Dignity, 65 MONT. L. REV. 135, 136–137 (2004). It should be noted that the Constitution of
Puerto Rico expressly prohibits the death penalty. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
36. Carlos E. Ramos Gonza´lez, La Inviolabilidad de la Dignidad Humana: lo indigno de la bu´s-
queda de expectativas razonables de intimidad en el derecho constitucional puertorriquen˜o, 45 REV.
JUR. U.I.P.R. 185, 203 (2011). According to Ramos Gonza´lez, “[i]t is an inescapable part of the history
of this section that the Constitution of Puerto Rico moved the citizens of Montana to adopt an identical
provision.” (translation by author). Id.
37. Jackson, supra note 32, at 22.
38. Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 317.
7
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source. As a result, the substantive content of the two provisions should be,
at the very least, very similar, with the Puerto Rican text setting the pace.
While Champoux did not elaborate on his proposal on the floor of the
Constitutional Convention to adopt the dignity clause of the Puerto Rican
Constitution in Montana, he did comment on his motivations, albeit years
later and in a most informal manner.39 As a result, the only direct source of
meaning for the Montana dignity clause is the Puerto Rican text and its
sources of meaning. As Clifford and Huff suggest, “[t]herefore, as a simple
matter of constitutional interpretation one can look to the body of case law
interpreting Puerto Rico’s dignity clause, as it existed at the time of the
framing of the Montana Constitution in 1972, to shed light on what our
constitution’s framers intended Montana’s dignity clause to mean.”40 While
this Article will later argue that post-1972 Puerto Rico case law is also
relevant as a source for the development of the meaning and scope of the
Montana provision, a strong case exists for using the pre-1972 Puerto Rican
sources.41
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has not actively used Pu-
erto Rican sources to interpret the dignity clause.42 Scattered references to
Puerto Rican sources have surprisingly been used to restrict or limit the
application of the clause.43 In fact, even though there are multiple legal
connections between Montana and Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican sources are
very scant in the decisions of the Montana Supreme Court.44 It should be
39. See Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 321 n.92, describing a phone conversation with
Champoux and his poignant story about how his mother faced discrimination as a woman, as well as the
history of mistreatment of the native peoples in Montana. The authors also express that there was “very
limited debate” as to this clause. Id. at 317. Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 317.
40. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
41. Puerto Rican scholars have also echoed this call. See Ramos Gonza´lez, supra note 36, at 203.
42. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1239 n.4 (Mont. 2009) (Rice, J., dissenting). (“The histori-
cal origins of the dignity clause are enlightening. At the Constitutional Convention, delegates reviewed
two foreign constitutions, the 1949 West Germany Constitution and the 1951 [1952] Puerto Rico Consti-
tution”). Yet, the dissent ends its inquiry here, instead of diving into comparative sources, particularly
Puerto Rico, which differs from the West German approach.
Curiously enough, the dissent in this case disagreed with the majority as to the interpretation of a
Montana statute related with a terminally ill patient’s right to a dignified death. This could be in tension
with a Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision that strengthened the right of patients to refuse medical
treatment that would result in death. See Lozada Tirado v. Tirado Flecha, 177 P.R. Dec. 893 (P.R. 2010).
See also Patricia Silva Musalem, La Fe ante la Muerte: Perspectivas sobre la eutanasia desde el catoli-
cismo, islamismo, hinduismo y judaı´smo, 5 REV. CLAVE, REV. ESTUDIOS CR´ITICOS DER. 151, 162 (2010)
(When discussing the right to die and assisted suicide in Puerto Rico, the author only references one
U.S. State: Montana).
43. See Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1239 n.4; Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 888–89 (Mont. 2003) (Gray,
C.J., dissenting).
44. See Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 134 n.1 (Mont. 2002). Curiously enough, both the Mon-
tana and Puerto Rican Supreme Courts have addressed very similar issues and have come to very similar
conclusions. Unfortunately, they have not cross-referenced each other. See, e.g., Oberg v. City of Bill-
ings, 674 P.2d 494 (Mont. 1983) and Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, 117 P.R. Dec. 35 (P.R. 1986) (both
8
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noted that Montana has made some recent appearances in Puerto Rican case
law.45 In Part III, I will return to this issue to address normative considera-
tions that would require both jurisdictions, particularly their respective Su-
preme Courts, to cross-reference each other.
The Montana Constitutional Convention’s practice of textual borrow-
ing from Puerto Rico did not end with the dignity clause. Montana’s dis-
crimination provision also took a page from the Puerto Rico Constitution.
The Puerto Rican Constitution prohibits discrimination on account of “race,
color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.”46
For its part, Montana prohibits discrimination on account of “race, color,
sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious beliefs.”47
Note that the lists of forbidden discriminations are almost identical and,
more strikingly, follow the same order. This is hardly a coincidence. On the
contrary, it is another example of direct textual borrowing on Montana’s
part.
Also note that the only difference between both lists is that Puerto
Rico mentions birth while Montana opted for culture. Is it a real difference
or just a matter of lost in translation? The answer to this question requires
further analysis, which is outside the scope of this Article.48 However, this
contrast reveals that the Puerto Rican approach to the concept of “birth,”
which focused on the issue of illegitimate children,49 has actually been un-
necessarily narrow, since the concept of ‘birth’ can also include where one
was born; in other words, national origin or culture.
As a result, a comparative analysis of Montana and Puerto Rico can
help re-examine Puerto Rico’s provision. Such is the promise of cross-refer-
encing both jurisdictions.
Finally, I wish to address both Constitutions’ prohibition on discrimi-
nation on the basis of social condition. The Montana Supreme Court’s dis-
cussions about this concept reveal the urgent necessity of a comparative
approach. It seems that the Montana Supreme Court has not articulated a
cases deal with the use of polygraph examinations for employees). Also, in his dissent in Sanchez et al.
v. Srio. de Justicia, 152 P.R. Dec. 643 (P.R. 2000) regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition on
same-sex intimate relations, then Associate Justice Herna´ndez Denton cited as authority the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision in Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 120 (Mont. 1997). Sanchez et al., 152 P.R.
Dec. at 650 (Denton, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., P.P.D. v. Ferre´, Gobernador, 98 P.R. Dec. 338, 456–57 (P.R. 1970) (Rigau, J., dis-
senting); Colegio de Abogados de P.R. v. Schneider, 112 P.R. Dec. 540, 547 (P.R. 1982); El Vocero de
P.R. v. ELA, 131 P.R. 356, Dec. 399 (P.R. 1992).
46. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
47. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
48. See Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 322. The authors also comment on the apparent differ-
ence between the Montana and Puerto Rican texts as to the issue of state action.
49. See Dı´az v. Ocasio, 88 P.R. Dec. 676 (P.R. 1963).
9
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clear doctrine as to this classification.50 At the very least, they recognize
that it is meant to protect poor people from discrimination.51 But that is not
enough.
This lack of definition is understandable. Most of the Puerto Rican
classifications were, in turn, borrowed from international sources, particu-
larly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But that text only makes
reference to social origin and the separate concept of economic position.52
Yet, a Socialist delegate to the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention pro-
posed a floor amendment to adopt social condition in addition to social
origin.53 In other words, social condition is an original Puerto Rican propo-
sal. Because Puerto Rico originated protection based on “social condition,”
it is essential to analyze the Puerto Rican source to better understand the
meaning of Montana’s provision.54
b. Other Constitutional Links: privacy, environmental protection
and a few more
The preceding discussion was based on a single section of both Consti-
tutions’ Bill of Rights. But the shared constitutional values and objects be-
tween Montana and Puerto Rico transcend dignity and discrimination.55 For
example, both Constitutions have an express right to privacy.56 Moreover, it
50. Compare Gazelka v. St. Peter’s Hosp., 347 P.3d 1287 (Mont. 2015) with McClanathan v.
Smith, 606 P.2d 507 (Mont. 1980). In McClanathan, the Court seems to adopt a narrow approach to
social condition, limiting it to protections against the poor. However, in Gazelka, the Court seems open
to a broader articulation. Puerto Rico has adopted a slightly more thorough doctrine on this point, com-
pared to other prohibited classifications.
51. McClanthan, 606 P.2d at 514.
52. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)).
53. See Rosario v. Toyota, 166 P.R. Dec. 1 (P.R. 2006).
54. Rosario, 166 P.R. Dec. at 35–37. In Rosario, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held, by a plural-
ity, that the concept “social condition” protects both poor people and persons whose social status carry
some sort of stigma. In that particular case, the Court held that an employer could not refuse to hire or
fire an employee because of a previous criminal record. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
Puerto Rican concept of “social condition,” see Jose´ Roque´ Vela´squez, Apuntes hacia una definicio´n del
discrimen por ‘origen o condicio´n social’, 39 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 183 (2004).
55. I began with a separate analysis of the dignity clause because, at least as to Puerto Rico, it is
clear that the dignity provision serves as an over-arching constitutional value that gives content and
meaning to the entire constitutional structure. In other words, it is not just another clause. See Jackson,
supra note 32, at 24–25 (“The Puerto Rican courts have emphasized statements by the drafters to the
effect that the right to human dignity was the foundational and most important element of that Bill of
Rights, one from which all others could be inferred even if they had not been express.”).
56. Puerto Rico’s privacy provision states: “Every person has the right to the protection of law
against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life.” P.R. CONST. art. II, § 8.
Montana’s Constitution states: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 10.
10
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seems that the Montana Constitutional Convention actually looked to the
Puerto Rican text for inspiration.57 As Mary Helen McNeal explains, “[l]ike
Montana’s Constitution, the Puerto Rican Constitution has an explicit right
to privacy, which has been interpreted in light of its dignity clause.”58 Once
more, we see an instance of Montana borrowing from Puerto Rico’s Consti-
tution.
Although the Montana Supreme Court has referenced Puerto Rico’s
dignity clause while Puerto Rico has not mentioned Montana’s, Montana
has remained silent on Puerto Rico’s privacy clause while Puerto Rico has
referenced Montana’s interpretation of privacy. While the Montana Su-
preme Court has referenced Puerto Rico’s dignity clause while the latter’s
Supreme Court has not, regarding the privacy clause it has been the other
way around. In Pueblo v. Dı´az, Bonano,59 the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
held that the use of sniffing police dogs to inspect objects does not consti-
tute a search. The majority opinion cited as authority the decision by the
Montana Supreme Court in State v. Scheetz,60 noting that both jurisdictions
have an express privacy provision.61
Both the Montana and Puerto Rico Constitutions explicitly adopt envi-
ronmental policy provisions and protect historical and cultural treasures.
Puerto Rico’s text states that:
It shall be the public policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop and
use its natural resources in the most effective manner possible for the gen-
eral welfare of the community; to conserve and maintain buildings and
places declared by the Legislative Assembly to be of historic or artistic
value.62
Montana’s Constitution has an entire Article dedicated to the issue of
environmental protection and the conservation of historical and cultural
treasures.63 Unlike the dignity and discrimination clauses, there is no evi-
dence of textual borrowing here. Yet, it is very telling that both Constitu-
tions opted for an express and affirmative policy of environmental protec-
tion. I will come back to this issue from a normative perspective in Part III.
For now, it’s enough to identify yet another constitutional similarity be-
tween Puerto Rico and Montana.
57. William C. Rava, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana’s Privacy Provision, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 1681, 1717 n.85 (1998), noting that the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission stud-
ied at least five states’ privacy provisions, including Puerto Rico. The other states were Alaska, Hawaii,
Michigan, and New Jersey.
58. Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a ‘Civil Gideon’ under the Montana Constitution: Parental
Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81, 137 n.114 (2005).
59. 176 P.R. Dec. 601, 605 (P.R. 2009).
60. 950 P. 2d 722, 727–28 (Mont. 1997).
61. Pueblo, 176 P.R. Dec. at 624–25.
62. P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 19.
63. MONT. CONST. art. IX.
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This similarity has been recognized by Montana scholars and Puerto
Rican justices. Barton H. Thompson, Jr. states that Montana’s Constitution
includes a “right to a clean and healthful environment.”64 According to the
author, the Montana Supreme Court “has broken league with other state
supreme courts and taken an activist approach to the [environmental] provi-
sions.”65 Curiously, Thompson mentioned Puerto Rico’s similar provision
concerning the environment.66 And while “[n]ot surprisingly, state courts
have concluded that such provisions are not self-executing,”67 this is not the
case in Puerto Rico, where, like in Montana, this constitutional provision is
wholly enforceable in court.68 In other words, while few state constitutions
have environmental policy provisions and even fewer enforce them in court,
Puerto Rico and Montana seem to take a similarly different direction.
Meanwhile, in his concurring opinion in Blassini v. Depto. Rec. Naturales,
then Associate Justice Herna´ndez Denton directly referenced the Montana-
Puerto Rico connection respecting the adoption of a constitutional environ-
mental policy provision in the context of hunting regulations.69 In particu-
lar, he cited as authority the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Boyer.70
Finally, it’s worth noting that in her concurring opinion in Pueblo v.
Sa´nchez Valle, Chief Justice Fiol Matta proposed that the Puerto Rican
double jeopardy clause impeded state prosecution after a prior federal pros-
ecution, independent of the dual sovereignty doctrine.71 In her analysis, Fiol
Matta referenced Montana, noting that Puerto Rico and Montana both share
the same dignity clause,72 and, more importantly, that the Montana Consti-
tution’s double jeopardy clause applies to subsequent state prosecutions af-
ter a federal one.73
64. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Mon-
tana’s Environmental Provision, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2003).
65. Id. at 159.
66. Id. at 161. See also Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Dalton L. Hooks, Jr., Protecting and Preserving
Our National Parks in the Twenty First Century: Are Additional Reforms Needed Above and Beyond the
Requirements of the 1998 National Parks Omnibus Management Act, 62 MONT. L. REV. 213, 265–266
(2001).
67. Thompson, Jr., supra note 64, at 161.
68. Paoli Me´ndez v. Rodrı´guez, 138 P.R. Dec. 449, 460 (P.R. 1995); Misio´n Ind. P.R. v. J.P., 146
P.R. Dec. 64, 171 (P.R. 1998).
69. Blassini v. Depto. Rec. Naturales, 176 P.R. Dec. 454, 498 (P.R. 2009) (Denton, C.J., concur-
ring).
70. Blassini, 176 P.R. Dec. at 498 (citing State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 776 (Mont. 2002)).
71. Pueblo v. Sa´nchez Valle, 192 P.R. Dec. 594 (P.R. 2015). The majority held that the dual sover-
eignty doctrine did not apply to Puerto Rico because it lacks an independent source of sovereignty. Only
Chief Justice Fiol Matta, joined by then Associate Justice Oronoz Rodrı´guez, proposed that, independent
of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Puerto Rican Constitution barred the subsequent state prosecution.
72. Pueblo, 192 P.R. Dec. at 723 n.249 (Fiol Matta, C.J., concurring).
73. Id.
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The double jeopardy example is revealing. It shows us that, even if not
done intentionally, the similarities between Montana and Puerto Rico will
inevitably lead courts of one jurisdiction to the other. This is because those
apparent coincidental similarities are actually a manifestation of a shared
legal DNA.
3. Back to Basics: The Montana-Puerto Rico Labor Connection
As we saw in the constitutional context, when it comes to issues of
labor and employment law, Puerto Rico and Montana share similar ap-
proaches. The constitutions of both jurisdictions address labor issues. In
particular, we saw that, in 1952, Puerto Rico mirrored some of Montana’s
provisions, though not directly. But the labor connection did not stop there.
Most U.S. states have adopted the employment-at-will doctrine. At the
same time, “[s]cholars have also constantly reminded themselves that only
three U.S. jurisdictions serve as exceptions to the at-will rule. Many legal
articles routinely reference Montana, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands as alternatives to the at-will model.”74 Both Montana and Puerto Rico
prohibit unjust or unfair dismissals.75
This means that Puerto Rico and Montana share an important policy
judgment that no other jurisdiction—save the U.S. Virgin Islands—has
made. This is remarkable, as it suggests that while nearly the entire United
States has embraced at-will employment, Montana and Puerto Rico have
both decided, separately, to take a different path. This path, in relative
terms, tends to protect workers from employer abuse and arbitrary dismis-
sal. In particular, both statutory regimes require a showing of good cause
for a dismissal, include public policy exceptions, and allow for greater pro-
tections by way of employee manuals.76 They are also quite similar when it
comes to the definition of a discharge, “particularly with respect to con-
structive dismissals.”77 The statutes do differ as to the burden of proof and
exhaustion requirements.78
74. Jorge M. Farinacci Ferno´s, The Search for a Wrongful Dismissal Statute: A Look at Puerto
Rico’s Act No. 80 as a Potential Starting Point, 17 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 125, 127 (2013).
See Id. at 127 n.8 for a list of scholars that have made similar assertions.
75. See Farinacci Ferno´s, supra note 74, at 127 and Donald C. Robinson, The First Decade of
Judicial Interpretation of the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT.
L. REV. 375 (1996).
76. Farinacci Ferno´s, supra note 74, at 154. This Article offers a more in-depth comparison be-
tween both regimes.
77. Id. at 155.
78. Id.
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There are other instances of shared labor and employment policy, in-
cluding protection to pregnant workers and working mothers,79 as well as
an apparent shared skepticism as to the use of the Federal Arbitration Act in
the labor context.80 This signals a shared labor-law DNA that is beyond
mere coincidence.
4. Additional Connections
I have already identified the most important legal connections between
Montana and Puerto Rico. But before we dive into this Article’s main nor-
mative proposal, it is worth mentioning some minor additional connections
between both jurisdictions. It is curious that when Alberto Bernabe-
Riefkohl discusses the issue of “access to courts” from the Puerto Rican
perspective, one of his go-to comparative jurisdictions is Montana, directly
referencing the Montana  Supreme Court’s decision in Madison v. Yunker.81
For his part, Judge Jose´ Alberto Morales Rodrı´guez also quoted from the
Montana Supreme Court when analyzing the issue of the constitutional
right to access information, referencing that Court’s decision in Yellow-
stone Cty. v. Billings Gazette.82
In Defendini Collazo et al. v. E.L.A., Cotto,83 the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court addressed the issue of sovereign immunity and the right to damages.
The opinion there cited as authority the Montana Supreme Court’s decision
in Meech v. Hill Haven West, Inc.84 Finally, Puerto Rican courts have also
referenced how Montana has entrenched in its Constitution the issue of uni-
versity autonomy.85
79. See Luis Antonetti, A Modern Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination: Puerto Rico’s Working
Mothers Protection Act, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 531 (1999).
80. See Farinacci Ferno´s, supra note 74, at 147; Bryan L. Quick, Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems
Corporation: Is the Montana Supreme Court Undermining the Federal Arbitration Act?, 63 MONT. L.
REV. 445 (2002).
81. Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, ‘Perdo´n, si es que te he faltado’: retracciones en casos de difama-
cio´n, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 635, 656–57 (1999) (citing Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126 (Mont. 1978)).
82. Jose´ Alberto Morales Rodrı´guez, Transparencia: Derecho Fundamental y Antı´doto contra la
corrupcio´n, 55 REV. DER. P.R. 35, 61–62 (2016) (citing Yellowstone Cty. v. Billings Gazette, 143 P.3d
135, 139 (Mont. 2006)).
83. 134 P.R. Dec. 28 (P.R. 1993).
84. Defendini, 134 P.R. Dec. 28 at 69 (citing Meech v. Hill Haven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491
(Mont. 1989)). The Defendini opinion also quoted J.A. Kutzman, The King’s Resurrection: Sovereign
Immunity Returns to Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 529, 536–37 (1990).
85. See, e.g., C.E.S. U.P.R. v. Gobernador, 137 P.R. Dec. 83, 117 n.13 (P.R. 1994).
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III. FROM COINCIDENTAL TO NORMATIVE: A HOW-TO GUIDE
A. Introduction
Part II of this Article was mostly descriptive. It identified the numer-
ous legal connections between Puerto Rico and Montana. Many of these
connections result from direct and intentional borrowing. Others are less
direct but still reveal a common conceptual approach. As we saw, there are
multiple connections. In other words, we are not dealing with an anomaly
or pure random coincidence. As such, there is room to propose a normative
model of comparative law between Montana and Puerto Rico.
At the very least, this model requires a comparative approach when
dealing with the many instances of direct borrowing. That is the result of
basic hermeneutics. But, the model can also transcend the specific instances
of connection and allow for a more general comparative approach between
both jurisdictions. In other words, the specific leads to the general.
B. Available Tools
From a purely hermeneutic point of view, the origin of borrowed legal
material is highly relevant to the interpretation and application of a legal
norm. This includes the doctrinal developments of that legal norm adopted
before the borrowing took place. When one jurisdiction borrows from the
other, it not only imports the text, but also the interpretations and construc-
tions that were given to it prior to adoption. This also includes its concep-
tual background and premises. As a result, the imported product is a combi-
nation of text and pre-adoption gloss.
This is known as the borrowed-statute doctrine, which states that
“when a legislator copies a statute from a foreign legislator, it can be pre-
sumed that she was aware of the way in which the statute had been con-
strued by the foreign courts.”86 As a result, this doctrine “establishes a pre-
sumption that a legislature that borrows statutory language from another
jurisdiction intended to adopt the judicial interpretations of the highest court
of the other jurisdiction.”87 This can apply to both statutory and constitu-
tional borrowing. As Taavi Annus explains, “[t]he very fact that a constitu-
tional provision has been borrowed, or that the legal system more generally
has roots in a foreign system, makes the courts in this other system an au-
86. Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law,
1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269, 275 (2003).
87. Alex B. Long, ‘If the Train Should Jump the Track. . .’: Divergent Interpretations of State and
Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 478 (2006) (citing Lenaerts v. D.C.
Dep’t of Employment Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1238 n.9 (D.C. 1988)).
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thority.”88 Of course, one must take care to effectively take into considera-
tion the “unique values and conditions of the borrowing state.”89
As to the doctrinal developments that occur after importation, the situ-
ation is a little different. The jurisdiction that borrowed the legal norm can-
not anticipate doctrinal developments and interpretations in the original ju-
risdiction that may happen in a later time. Yet, when two jurisdictions share
the same legal norm, sound hermeneutics would suggest that they arrive at
similar conclusions. As such, cross-reference and comparative analysis for
developments that take place after borrowing seem in order. As a result,
while not automatically binding, the judicial interpretations and doctrinal
developments that take place after importation are highly relevant and per-
suasive.
This cross-reference goes both ways. That is, it’s not limited to the
jurisdiction that does the borrowing. Similar cross-reference should be
made by the original jurisdiction regarding the developments in the borrow-
ing jurisdiction. In other words, if a jurisdiction copies a legal norm from an
original source, the original source cannot simply ignore what the second
jurisdiction does with the imported legal norm. How other jurisdictions in-
terpret and apply the norm can aid the original jurisdiction in its own future
development of the norm.
The preceding analysis applies to instances of direct and particularized
borrowing. Yet, precisely because of the existence of multiple instances of
direct borrowing, jurisdictions can share enough legal DNA to warrant
other uses of cross-reference and comparative analysis in a more general
sense. In other words, cross-reference is not limited to specific instances of
legal borrowing. At some point, there are enough single instances to con-
clude that there are general connections that warrant comparative analysis.
When this happens, one jurisdiction can serve as the go-to comparative
source for the other.
C. Specific Areas
1. Direct Borrowing
As discussed, Montana has borrowed directly from Puerto Rico on
several occasions. The most evident are the dignity and anti-discrimination
clauses of that state’s constitution. As to the dignity clause, it is a verbatim
reproduction. Regarding the anti-discrimination provision, while there is
apparent daylight due to a particular choice of words—culture as opposed
88. Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the
Right Strategy, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 301, 336 (2004).
89. Id. at 336.
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to birth—the Montana list of outlawed discrimination is identical to the
Puerto Rican text, even mimicking the order of classifications. This was not
happenstance or chance; it was the product of intentional borrowing after
research, analysis, and deliberation.
As such, the borrowed-statute doctrine applies full force. We saw that
authors like Clifford and Huff have already suggested that, “as a simple
matter of constitutional interpretation one can look to the body of case law
interpreting Puerto Rico’s dignity clause, as it existed at the time of the
framing of the Montana Constitution in 1972, to shed light on what our
constitution’s framers intended Montana’s dignity clause to mean.”90 Thus,
as a normative matter, Montana courts should treat the Puerto Rico Su-
preme Court’s interpretations of these clauses as authoritative. As a descrip-
tive matter, that has not happened yet. There is no reason why that practice
should continue.
And what about Puerto Rico Supreme Court decisions issued after
1972? While not authoritative, they should still be considered persuasive.
By the same token, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court should also turn to
Montana case law as part of its interpretive analysis when applying the
Puerto Rican clauses. The same would apply to other current circumstances
where one jurisdiction borrowed directly from the other.
2. Similar Paths
Montana and Puerto Rico have more in common than discrete in-
stances of direct borrowing. Whether independent of, coincidental, caused
by, or an effect of this reality, the fact remains that Puerto Rico and Mon-
tana share many similar approaches to critical areas of law, both constitu-
tional and statutory. Whether it is the environmental and privacy provisions
adopted in their respective constitutions or the shared approach to unjust
dismissals, there is enough common ground on critical issues to warrant
cross-reference and comparative analysis. That common ground is high-
lighted by the vast differences between these two jurisdictions and the rest
of the states in the United States, most of which lack a dignity clause, envi-
ronmental provisions entrenched in the Constitution, or statutory protec-
tions against unjust dismissals.
This creates a perfect storm in favor of preferential cross-reference.
Unlike instances of direct borrowing, where pre-adoption developments are
seen as authoritative, while post-adoption events are seen as persuasive—in
both directions, here the approach is different, but no less real. Montana and
Puerto Rico’s shared legal DNA on these issues warrant a most-preferred
jurisdiction status as to comparative law.
90. Clifford & Huff, supra note 32, at 321 (emphasis added).
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D. A More General Approach
1. Constitutional Law
So far we have seen instances of borrowing or shared approaches to
many different issues between Puerto Rico and Montana. But, the constitu-
tional link seems to be the strongest, whether through direct borrowing, like
the dignity and discrimination clauses, or by way of similar policy judg-
ments, as in the case of the environmental and labor provisions. As to the
former, the borrowed statute doctrine applies. As to the latter, it is a matter
of first preference cross-reference.
But what about the rest of the Bill of Rights in Puerto Rico’s and
Montana’s Constitutions? Or the rest of the Constitutions for that matter? I
propose that the previously discussed instances of direct borrowing and
shared approaches to several constitutional issues warrant a model of cross-
reference and comparative analysis that includes the rest of the provisions
of the Montana and Puerto Rico Bills of Rights. Unlike the previous issues,
I am not arguing in favor of authoritative or persuasive cross-reference. But,
the instances of legal connection between the Montana and Puerto Rico
approaches to constitutional rights have created a shared space that can also
include other constitutional provisions that are not as directly similar as the
ones we have discussed until now.
My proposal is proportional. Regarding direct borrowing, pre-adoption
developments are authoritative. As to post-adoption events, these are per-
suasive. For shared approaches in discrete instances, I’ve proposed a strong
first-preference model. For the rest of the Bill of Rights, considering the
many instances of direct borrowing and shared approaches in the respective
constitutional texts, I propose a less stringent version of the first-preference
model.
2. General Law
What about other areas of law? Here the distance may be greater be-
tween Montana and Puerto Rico law. After all, Puerto Rico is still a mixed
system that is mainly founded on the civil law tradition, while Montana is a
common law jurisdiction. More to the point, Montana and Puerto Rico are
separate societies with different problems and potential solutions. Each ju-
risdiction should exercise their democratic tools to carve out their own pol-
icy choices. They are not bound to each other and I’m sure there are many
areas of real and direct disagreement or clash between Montana and Puerto
Rican law. However, it never hurts to find out and simply give each other a
look. As we have seen in this Article, we might be very surprised as to what
we find.
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 79 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/2
